Left Center Left

David Eisenthal looks at a growing and seemingly insurmountable problem (the budget deficit) and comes up with an interesting, reasonable sounding solution that I’m nonetheless going to have to disagree with: a line-item veto amendment to the constitution. First, his case for it:

One idea that should be considered is an amendment to the United States Constitution that would 1) prescribe a consolidated budget and appropriations process (instead of a “budget” process followed by thirteen separate appropriations bills and 2) give to the President the power to make line-item vetoes in the budget. This amendment would give the President roughly the same budgetary powers as most Governors of states. The President is the one federal official who really represents all of the people - and can act in the best fiscal interest of all of the people.

… Such an amendment might seem far-fetched, but such far-fetched thinking will be necessary in order to maintain control of our fiscal destiny.

Practically speaking, I don’t see a constitutional amendment as very likely; there’s no groundswell of support, and if there were the political will for it, there would also be the political will for Congress to stick to arbitrary budgetary restrictions, like Gramm-Rudman.

But on the merits itself, the case for the amendment seems to collapse three different issues: 1) whether there’s some reason of legitimation that mandates budgetary decisions being under greater control of the executive branch over the legislative; 2) whether and to what extent the current budgetary is driven primarily by appropriations bundling; and 3) whether over the long run, executive line-item would in fact unsure the proper fiscal decisions.

Legitimation: Yes, the president represents the entire country while legislators represent districts and states. But Congress as a whole represents the country. It’s not clear to me that an individual represents the will of the people better than the collective of the legislature. There’s also the practical problem that under the Electoral College system, the President’s potential votes necessary aren’t geographically disbursed; Bush and Rove handpicked tariffs to benefit PA and WV as transparently as a mid-Atlantic senator would, in order to shore up political support in swing states. Consolidating in the executive may curb the paradoxical dynamic wherein legislators don’t feel like they can vote for the common good, because their district will lose out if they decline potential spending; it, however, may also exacerbate a political spoils system. Just look at the case of civil service in the executive branch.

Current budget shortfall: Yes, there’s been a pork fest lately, as the Republicans have traded political influence for lobbyist dollars. But ultimately, the foremost problem is that we have a series of sizeable tax cuts, combined with increasing budgetary demands for the Iraq War, for homeland security, and for rising health costs. Unless we cut a couple of these major costs, we’re going to have to raise taxes substantially to avoid deficit over the next decade. Given the documentable dishonesty the President used to sell the tax cuts, and the fuzzy math of each of the White House’s budgets, what indication do we have that putting more power into Bush’s hands would have produced fiscal sanity?

The Long Run: This is a harder call, as on average a line-item veto would decrease pork spending, which other things being equal (sound fiscal policy) would lead to spending constraints. However, I wonder about negative consequences. Pork excesses are merely dysfunctional manifestations of something often functional (if bizarre to the outside observer); the budgetary process allows a large numbers of districts and constituencies to balances their desires and interests. Short circuiting the process with executive fiat will cut down on the waste, but it may cut down on necessary projects and spending as well.

Disagreement aside, I couldn’t agree with David more on the seriousness of the fiscal matters at hand.