My friend Derek has before asked me if, given my non-Hegelian bent, whether I subscribed to some End of History thesis, the notion that political and economic liberalism has once and for all triumphed over alternatives. I wasn’t very good at answering the question: I felt that a) yes in the medium term liberalism and capitalism do seem to have had victories of success; b) undoubtedly some future political economic configuration could come that, while perhaps capitalistic, would likely be quite different than capitalism as we know; and c) we can’t know now what that future political economy may look like. Essentially, I’m not good at looking into the future, yet feel sure the political economy will develop and History will march on, just not along Marxian-Hegelian lines.
These thoughts came to mind reading Stephen Cohen and Brad Delong’s excellent article on globalization in this month’s Atlantic Monthly. It’s subscription only sadly, but I’d recommend it to anyone who wants an accessible, fair-minded assessment of the economics and politics of international trade that will affect us in the upcoming decades. As economists, the authors avoid the hysterical media coverage over outsourcing while arguing that in fact we’re underestimating the scope of change that will hit American society and politics.
But their piece goes beyond the current debate over free trade and makes a credible prediction of the future. Take this passage on the future stakes in class conflict:
Winners and losers are unlikely to sort cleanly. People of similar background and training may see their fortunes diverge greatly depending on subspecialty, or on the presence or absence of some idiosyncratic ability that is hard to replicate. But one can make a few predictions. First, the new environment is likely to pit those who are most flexible—most able to shift jobs or careers, most able to absorb unexpected blows, best positioned to benefit from unforeseen opportunities—against those who are less so. The contours of such a divide seem predictable: young versus old, generalist versus specialist, people with savings versus those who depend on their next paycheck.
A second (and overlapping) split might open between those who are highly educated and possess complex skills and those who are merely well educated and skilled. An MIT education may still be hard to imitate abroad. Can the same be said of a finance degree from a state college?
Third, a divide may occur between those—whatever their education or income level—who by disposition can tolerate unexpected income swings across a lifetime and those who abhor uncertainty.
If they’re right, globalization will entail as big a shift in class relations as the rise of white collar labor and the wage-enslavement of the bourgeoisie. And even more than in the previous revolution (occurring early-to-mid 20th century), Marxist and populist political impulses will have a hard time making sense in the new arrangements of production. Similarly, conservatism will quite possibly feel pressure to abandon its love of flexible labor markets: after all the petit bourgeoisie comprising the GOP political base will likely feel the hit the hardest. I suspect the odd, fumbling political realignment between the two major parties that’s going on right now is only the beginning of a larger shift, and in any case is superstructural to shifts in the political economy.
As a side note, the Cohen/Delong emphasis on risk makes me wonder if I should give Robert Shiller’s book a closer read.
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